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NOTE OF TRANSMITTAL
In a brief but intensive study we have investigated f
the benefits that will accrue from the application of NASA
sponsored fuel conservative technology developments in the
U.S. commercial aircraft fleet.
Models which forecast as a function of time the
demand for commercial passenger air transportation (revenue
passenger miles) and the composition of the aircraft fleet to
supply the transportation, have been developed and applied to
estimate the fuel savings that result from the proposed
program.
The gallons of fuel saved and the net economic
benefits produced by the fuel savings are both quantified.
Principal Investigators for this study were
Dr. P. Ginsberg and Dr. P.M. Lion. Dr. A.L. .Kornhauser
performed the analysis of the technology combinations,
and Dr. R. Fish assisted in the collection of the data
base and the evaluation of the results.
We wish to express our gratitude to Dr. J. Klineberg
and Mr. L. Williams of NASA for their assistance in the.
formulation of the •probl_m and in obtaining certain of the
key data needed to perform the study.
Project Manager:
Miller
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1.0 SUMMARY
This report estimates costs and benefits of a Fuel
Conservative Aircraft Technology Program proposed by NASA. The
proposes:[ program has six separate technology elements defined
by NASA:
(a) Engine Component Improvement
Li
(b) Composite Structures
(c) Turboprops
(d) Laminar , Flow Control
(e) Fuel Conservative Engine
(f) Fuel Conservative Transport
There are two levels: the baseline program is estimated
to cost $490 million. over 10 years with peak funding in 1980.
The Level II Program is estimated to cost an additional $180
million also over 10 years. 	 Peak funding for the entire program
occurs	 in 1979.	 Emphasis throughout the program is on imple-
mentation of the research in operational aircraft at the earliest
possible date.	 Therefore,	 items such as maintainability andT
'. reliability receive high priority.
Discussions with NASA and with representatives of the
major commercial airframe manufacturers were held to estimate tl.e
combinations of the technology elements most likely to be
implemented,	 the potential fuel savings from each combination,
and reasonable dates for incorporation of these new aircraft
1-1
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into the fleet. The consensus of these discussions was that,
with the NASA program,	 four fuel conservative aircraft are
' likely to be introduced before 2000:	 a short range aircraft
^$ in 1987 with 35% fuel savings, a derivative of this model in
1995 with 45% fuel savings,	 a medium range aircraft in 1990
with 45% fuel savings, and a long range aircraft in 1995 with
45% fuel savings. The short range aircraft would be turbo-
props with composite materials used for the wing and tail.
They would have an improved engine core and several aerodynamic
improvements. The medium range aircraft would also be a turbo-
prop and would be an all composite structure; it would also
incorporate improvements in engine technology az,d aerodynamic
improvements. The long range aircraft would be . made of
composite materials, would use laminar flow control, and would
have a new fuel conservative engine. All four would have active
controls.
To estimate the fuel savings for these aircraft, demand
for domestic air travel (revenue passenger-miles) was projected
through 2005. From an analysis of trends in GNP and yield
(average price of air transportation) a growth rate of about 4.2% r}
over this period was estimated. The market for new aircraft
V
'; G	 was estimated using a fleet inventory model. Key assumptions of
an aircraft lifetime o f 15 years and load factors of 55% are
discussed, and the sensitivity of the results to these parameters
is calculated.
1-2
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Two scenarios were run using these models. The first 
assumes that the NASA research program is not undertaken and 
that several evolutionary fuel conservative changes. based 
on existing technology, are incorporated into derivative air-
craft in the early 1980's. Improvement in specific fuel con-
sumption I<ould be about 10%. The second scenario assumes the 
NASA research program is undertaken and'introduces both the 
derivative aircraft and the new aircraft described above. Fuel 
savings attributable to the N~SA Program are the difference 
between the tl<O scenarios analyzed. 
Results for the baseline case (4.2% growth rate) are 
90.3 billion gallons of fuel (or approximately 2.15 billion 
barrels)* will be saved for domestic and U.S. international air 
operations over the 30 year period (1976-2005). These results 
are shown in Figure 1.1. This is about 21% of the total that 
would otherwise be used. To put this figure in perspective, 
the entire United States consumes about 17 million barrels of 
petroleum products daily for all uses (1974) • On an annual 
basis in 2005, the savings are 9.1 billion gallons per year or 
about 40%'of the fuel that would otherwise be consumed by the 
u.S. domestic and international commercial aircraft fleet. 
The figure cited is on the conservative side, since the assumed 
growth rate (4.2%) is lower than many estimates. The savings 
grow exponentially with increasing growth rates. 
*1 barrel = 42 gallons (jet fuel) 
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The sensitivity of these reoults to changes in the
parameters was calculated. For example, delay of the entire
program for one year reduces fuel savings by about. 8 billion
cumulatively. On the other hand, acceleration of the entire
program by one year increases savings by about the same amount.
A shortfall of 5% in achieving the target R&D objectives of
reducing specific fuel consumption reduces fuel savings by
about 9.5 billion gallons (10%) cumulatively. If the target
objectives are surpassed by 5% an additional savings of about
9.5 billion, gallons will be obtained. increasing load factor
to GO% decreases fuel savings by about 7.5 billion gallons but
the percentage savings remain almost the same. Increasing
aircraft lifetime to 20 years reduces fuel savings by about
12.5 billion gallons. However, fuel consumption without the
NASA program is higher and, therefore, the savings become
relatively more important.
To compare the savings in fuel requirements in the late
1980's and the 1990's to the program costs from 1976 to 1985,
discount rates of 10% and 5%.were used. In the most conserva-
tive case U.S. jet fuel prices were assumed to remain constant
at 22 cents per gallon; tl;e present value of the savings then
is $2.7 billion ($ 1975) at a 10L discount rate, compared to a
present value of the NASA R&D program costs of $425 million
0 1975). The payback date is 1990. With a discount rate of
5% the present value of the savings is $6.4 billion ($ 1975)
and the payback date is 1989.
1-5
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Alternatively, if fuel costs escalate at a rate of 7%
a year, then the present value of the savings is . $11.7 billion
($ 1975) at a 10% discount rate. The payback date is 1987.
Iith a discount rate of 5% and an escalation of fuel costs of
2%, the present value of the savings is $14.4 billion ($ 1975).
The payback date remains 1987.
in summary, within the broad range of alternatives con--
^idered the Fuel Conservative Aircraft Technology Program pry
posed by NASA promises substantial returns to U.S. society
under very conservative assessment criteria.
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I2.0 INTRODUCTION
: Since the Arab oil embargo in 1973 and the effective
carteli.zation of OPEC oil prices in 1974,	 the Unified States
government has encouraged serious fuel conservation measures
and efforts to reduce dependence upon foreign sourcLs. of energy.
In response to these national objectives, NASA, 	 in collaboration
With industry, i.s proposing a research and development program
to demonstrate the technology necessary for a nett/generation of
fuel efficient commercial transports.
There exists a 10-to 15-year research and development
lead time .preceding operational certi.f:ication.for.commercial
transports.	 Aircraft in the present fleet were conceived,
de s igned, and produced.to balance fuel, maintenance,	 capital,
and labor costs based on design cost parameters that are no
longer applicable.	 in parti cular,	 aircraft operating economics
have been bused on jet fuel prices of 9^ to 12$ a gallon.	 Fuel
prices had remained in that range for 20 year s prior to 1974.	 In
1974, however, airline fuel contracts were negotiated reflecting
100% domestic fuel price increases': 	 For U.S.	 international
r;
flights, price increases were 2000.
The purpose of this investigation is to assess the fuel
savings and economic benefits that may evolve from the proposed
NASA research. and development program.	 The assessment will be
conducted by evaluating the streams of expected benefits and
1u
K+
+%
expected costs (not including industry expenditures) from NASA sup-- 	 l
f
E
ported efforts. Since physical shortages of petroleum products have
resulted in government intervention in resource allocation mech-
anisms using complicated allocation formulas, net dollar estimates
of benefit streams may not suffice due to the unpredictability of
"market prices." Therefore, benefits will be measured in both
dollar values and in terms of total domestic fuel saved in satis-
fying the demands for air transportation by United States carriers.
The process of commercial aircraft development is both
continuous and incremental. In a given time period, both derivatives
of current production aircraft and entirely new designs may be
introduced. The need to examine both derivative models and the new
generation of aircraft incorporating the proposed research and
development program implies a planning cycle of 30 years, i.e., to
the year 2005. A 30-year planning horizon limits the usefulness
and feasibility of methodologies based upon network or city-pair
traffic demands and financial flow analyses of individual air-
lines. While these "bottom up" approaches (which require large
data bases) are necessary fbr short term planning, in this case,
it is necessary to concentrate on aggregate analysis of the entire
industry. Therefore, such problems as apparent overcapacity at
W some points, or whether one airframe manufacturer'or a particular
?	 airline could finance the development and acquisition of new
aircraft, will not be addressed. The "top down" approach compares
i
the aircraft fleet that would be in existence without the NASA
r,,
». {(p
lP
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R&D program with the fleet which results assuming the NASA
program is undertaken and the technology is transferred and
-i
incorporated into derivative and new generation aircraft.
In order to isolate the interaction between supply and
demand factors, the assessment of benefits and costs is made
for a given demand structure that is invariant to the NASA
research and development program. This approach eliminates
t^	 k
the double counting of benefits.
The history of technology transfer to the commercial, trans
port fleet has been characterized by the joint application of
1
3a	 '
military and private sector developments.* However, since fuel
conservation is not a principal mission of the military, it can be
expected that the development costs shared in the past by the U.S.
government through military funding will have to come from other
f
sources. Therefore, a gap exists in the support levels which
have historically been available for research and development in
Ry
V!	 3	
5
this area. This gap can be filled by NASA participation. Without
I
NASA participation, profitability and stockholder preferences
of individual firms will be the primary criteria for develop me nt	 -^
efforts. These criteria will not necessarily lead to the same
emphasis on fuel conservation, especially where uncertain or
i
divergent views with respect to future pricing and availability
c^
of fuel are held.
*Working Group Reports, AIAA workshop Conference,
December 2-4, 1974; The Role of Technology_in Commercial_ Aircraft
Policy Formulation, AIAA, March 21, 1975. p. 34. 	 .7
V ECON, Inc. has examined the NASA R&D proposals and has,
with NASA's cooperation, visited Lockheed, McDonnell-Douglas,
and the Boeing advanced development departments. The purpose
of these visits was to help assess the feasibility and timing
of combinations of technology programs. The technology programs
identified represent best judgements for a statib analysis of
potential fuel savings. Ongoing economic assessments of a
NASA program need to be undertaken in order to incorporate
evolving achievements that feed back into the R&D allocation
process. Explicit breakthroughs in technology which are econ-
omically reasonable are difficult to predict. However, if
success is demonstrated in one area, funds can be transferred
from another area to-exploit the technology breakthrough.
e
3.0 PROJECTIONS OF AIR TRAVEL DEMAND
3.1	 Industry Outlook
While much research is being conducted on ai.Lernate
forms of energy, the U.S. and wcrld airline industries will
rely on petroleum fuels for the forseeable future. It is our
assessment that hydrogen-fueled and nuclear-powered airplanes
will not be incorporated into the flee`. until after the year
2000. Using historical life--cycle relationships for subsonic
aircraft, two generations of petroleum-fueled aircraft can be
expected in this period; namely "derivative" models which will
become operational in the mid--1990 1 s. The economics of airline
finances and operations will determine the dates of introduction
of both generations. This implies that new aircraft will be
put into service to satisfy the demand for air-travel.
NASA's proposed R&D program can substantially alter
the kind of aircraft and,	 hence,	 the level of fuel efficiency
that the manufacturers will offer the airlines.
3.1.1 Fuels
As shown in a recent survey the fuel problem has be-
come the number one problem of the airlines.'* (See	 Table	 3.1.)
*Conducted by L. Williams of NASA Ames Research Center
at the "Transportation Demand and Systems Analysis Conference,"
June 2--4, 1975 Washington, D.C.
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Table 3.1	 Air Transportation Problem Priorities
Average Response 	 (1=H19hest,	 6-Lowest)
Number of Airport Ground Fuel Other
Affiliation Responses Emissions Noise Congestion Access Cost Casts
Airline 12 5.3 4.4 3.3 3.6 2.3 2.6
Manufacturer 8 5.1 3.5 3.4 2.8 3.0 3.3
University 9 4.'9 3.7 3.4 2.1 2.9 3.4
Government 8 4.5 2.9 3.5 2.9 3.3 4110
Other 5 4.0• 5.4 4.2 4.0 1.8 3.2
All 42 4.9 3.9 3.5 3.0 2.7 3.2
"Ranking 6 5 4 2 ] 3
CIN
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Moreover,	 forecasts by the air transportation industry of
future fuel prices over the next decade indicate increases as
l high as 320% of present price levels.	 For purposes of this
evaluation,	 it is assumed that 1980 domestic fuel prices will
reach the level of present international fuel prices	 (35 cents/
gallon)	 and, them..fter, will follow the general trend in con-
Sumer prices.	 In preliminary analysis for Project Independence
it has been estimated that the U.S. 	 domestic supply in 1985
could be	 15 million barrels/day.* 	 Based on 1974 usage
allocations,** this implies less than 1 million bbl/day of
i_ jet fuels available for military, Private and airline industry
use.	 This represents 6% of total petroleum consumption.	 Zf,
then,	 only 900,000 bbl/day are available in 1985, the demand
:i for air travel may exceed available supply. 	 This constraint,'
if effective,. would imply a greater degree of regulation of
air fares and a deterioration in the availability of service.
3.2	 Demand for U.S.	 Domestic Air Travel
.; While domestic air travel, measured by revenue
F'
passenger miles, has grown , an average of 11.00 over the last
13 years,
	
industry, private and government forecasts predict
1i
.	 , - A
*Project Independence Report, Federal Energy Administra-
tion, November 1974,p 81 (at $11 per barrel under business as
usual assumptions).
is
**"980,000 bbl/day of jet fuel demand out of 16,960,000
i	 bbl/dap of total demand." The Oil and Gas Journal, January 27,
1975, p. 104.
3-4
a
1
growth to fall within the range of 4.0% to 8.0o for the 1975
to 1990 period. This fall-off in growth can mainly be de-
scribed by the term "maturing industry." After examination of
these forecasts, quantitative explanations have been difficult
to obtain. Our forecast of the demand for air travel uses two
explanatory or independent variables: real income and the price
per mile of air travel (yield). The historical period used to
generate parameters from which our conditional forecasts are
made is 1962 through 1974, the period associated with commercial,
jet transports. Real income and real price were used to ex-
^^
	
	 plain revenue passenger mile demand assuming a linear rela-
tionship. During the period 1962-1974, GNP (deflated by the
consumer price index) increased at an average annual rate of
3.6% and yield (deflated by the consumer price index) decreased
at an average annual rate of -2.8%_ During the 1960's and
early 1970's airline travel was a "good buy." For the forecast,
it is assumed that deflated GNP will grow at an average annual
rate of 3.0% and that yield will decrease at an annual rate of
i,
!	 -1.0% over the thirty year planning period.
i,
The GNP forecast is, of course, uncertain. The yield
assumptions are supported by the implementation of the one-stop
charter, resulting in average load factors which will not fall
below 550, and more productive aircraft in the fleet. The
continual decrease in fields (-Z 0 a rowth) a li p s both withy	 -^ g	 pp
i
and without the NASA R&D program. This will hold even if the	 )
;d
decrease in direct operating costs resulting from the incorpora-
tion of fuel, conservative technology will be offset by higher
capital costs, It should be pointed out that the'-l% fore-
cast in yield growth is only 35% of the average decrease of the
past thirteen years. Moreover, CAB regulation and route
structuring provide support for the assumption of a real de-
crease in yield. While at first this appears to be an optimis-'
tic assumption about the future long run cost of air travel, the
derived forecasted demand for air travel is still conservative-
The average annual compound growth rate of revenue passenger
miles is forecasted to be 4.2% to the year 2005. Since the
demand estimate is conservative, net benefits accruing to the
NASA R&D program will also be conservative. In order to test
the robustness of the benefit estimates, growth Yates between
3% and 8% were incorporated into the analysis. The forecasted
demand envelope is assumed to be invariant to -the NASA R&D
program. That is, while NASA technology efforts increase fuel
efficiency and give impetus to reduced fares through reduced
direct operating costs, it is assumed that increased capital
costs for the new technology will offset these implied de-
creases in direct operating costs, While valid for a "first
order" estimate this assumption needs further investigation
during an ongoing assessment program.
S- ter
.r
U.S.International Demand for Air Travel
In 1974 international revenue passenger miles were
3-5
__1
i
33.2 billion or approximately 25% of domestic travel. Since
changes in the international exchange rate have large effects
on total trip costs, conditional forecasts on exchange rates
x would add another dimension to the forecasting problem. More-
over, while our analysis shows that international travel is
more sensitive to income changes and less sensitive to price
changes than is domestic travel, the incorporation of exchange
rate movements would likely cancel out any differences in in-
come and price sensitivities. 'therefore, it is assumed that
the 1974 relationship of international revenue passenger miles
(RPM'S) by U.S. carriers will remain a constant 25% of domestic
RPM's in the future, an"' that aircraft fleets for international
travel. (along with fuel consumption) can be estimated from the
y;	 U.S. domestic forecasts.
3.4
	 Foreign Demand for Aircraft
Foreign demand for aircraft has a positive impact on
the U.S. balance of payments and presently the great majority
of the sales backlog of airframe manufacturers is-for foreign
delivery.* The world jet aircraft fleet (excluding the USSR)
3-7
owned by the rest of the world, While foreign travel (non-	 fi
=	 f	 f
s,
	
	 U.S. airports) has no direct impact on U.S. fuel conservation,
the aircraft and engine manufacturers take into account total
world sales in deciding whether to commit to a development
F
effort. With higher international fuel prices, the NASA R&D
effort will likely provide additional benefit in the form of
an incentive for the purchase of U.S. built fuel cgnservative
aircraft by the airlines of other nations. in estimating the
effect on balance of payments, it is assumed that the ratio
between U.S. and foreign fleets is maintained for the period
d	 under consideration, and that for every aircraft sold to a
U.S. airline, one aircraft is purchased by a foreign (non-U.S.)
airline.*
i^
*This assumption has been corroborated by industry
spokesmen.
Na5a's proposeu Tuei conservation -cecnnoiogy program
is a result of the combined efforts of scientists, engineers
and managers from NASA (Ames, Langley, Lewis, and Flight
Research Centers), airframe industry (Boeing, McDonnell--Douglas,
Lockheed), engine manufacturers (Allison, Gena_^al Electric,
Pratt & Whitney, Hamilton Standard) and air carriers (United,
Delta, Eastern, TWA). Additionally, NASA has convened an
Advisory Board consisting of representatives of academia and
the concerned industries to review the proposed program. The
purpose of the program is to provide technological advancement
opportunities that will result in conservation of fuel in air
transport, with a goal of developing and demonstrating the
technology for implementation in new generations of fuel--
efficient aircraft.
Six major programs have been defined, Included are
'three programs that focus on the implementation of evolutionary
improvements in aerodynamics and propulsion. The remaining
three programs, composite primary structures, turboprops and
laminar flow control, represent efforts to develop tocn-
nologies that may result in large fuel savings even though they
are radically different from those currently used in civil air
f
a
transports.
in several cases two levels of activity were defined
by NASA for each technology element. Those activities judge d
4-3'
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to be of first priority were grouped in what is called the
l
baseline program. In some cases, additional work judged to be
important but of Lower priority was also defined and designated	 J
7
as the Level 11 program.
In meetings with the hardware manufacturers it was
emphasized that from a theoretical standpoint there is no doubt
that each technology program could indeed lead to fuel conserva-
tion; the real challenge is to develop the technologies to a
F
	
	 point where they can be incorporated in production aircraft
and result in a more economic air transport system at the
earliest possible date.
4.1
	
Elements of the Technology Program
4.l.l	 Engine Component Improvement
This-effort is directed at developing improved engine
components -that could be used in new production of existing
engine types and in newly designed engines. The focus of the
program iE aimed at producing an engine that will not suffer a
large degradation of performance while in service as well as
the development of fuel-efficient components . . Elements of the
program include the development of wear resistant blade shapes,
active clearance controls, mixers and compliant seals. The
proposed activity includes tests of in-service engines in order
to determine the causes of engine performance degradation with
time. These improved components are expected to,be ready for
use on engines produced after 1980, Tt is est^mated that
successful development could lead to a 5% decrease in engine
specific fuel consumption, relative to the specific fuel con-
sumption of present--generation high bypass ratio engines.
Proposed funding for the engine component improvement
program through 1980 totals $40 million of which $15 million
is desig__:, ted for component tests and $25 million for engine
tests.
The aircraft manufacturers strongly support this pro-
gram and believe that the 5% fuel savings is achievable within
the proposed funding and time frame. Probability of success
for this program is considered to be extremely high.
4.1.2	 Fuel--Conservative Engine
This „propulsion activity is directed at providing the
technology base for achievin g higher thermodynamic efficiencies
in future engine designs. The program Includes a rigorous com-
ponent development program exploring the design of fans, com-
pressors, combustors, turbines, seals and bearings as well as
.I
investigation of unconventional propulsion, concepts including
regenerators.
Funding totaling $115 million would be provided for
F'
.improved components to be proved out in a experimental engine
program b one contractor. An additional amount of $60 million
	 Y
could support a second contractor in a parallel effort. This
i`
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funding would result in the technology readiness of future
F
engines by the first half of the 1980's (1982), Engines using
this technology could be expected to be ready for use in new
aircraft introduced into service by the late: 1980's (1988) and
would result in a 10-15% reduction in specific fuel consumption,
relative to the specific fuel consumption of present-generation
high byp ass ratio engines.
While enthusiastic in its support of NASA's continued
research in fuel-conservative engine components and a little
less supportive of the possibilities of the potential fuel
savings, the airframe manufacturers were cautious about their
support of the realistic implementation potential of the pro-
gram. They warned of the potential increased maintenance burden
on the airlines that could result in the (small) probability
that direct operating costs may increase, They stressed that
ease--of--maintenance should be held as a major goal of the NASA
program in this area.
Probability of implementation of this technology is
relatively lower than for some of the other programs because
of the maintenance quaation.
i
4.1.3	 Composite Primary Aircraft Structi ;res
The use of composite materials in the primary struc-
tural co-nponents of aircraft offers the potential of substantial
vehicle weight savings. These weight savings translate into fl-el
savings of the order of 10-12% as compared to all-metal aircraft,
4-4
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Extensive service experience Is requIxed ,n order to enable the
airframe industry to commit to the extensive use of composite
primary structures in new transport aircraft.	 The NASA program
•
j
F
j
is structured to minimize the risk to the airframe manufacturers
in the implemen4ation of composite structure technology in new
transport aircraft, The previously planned NASA program called
for service testing of a composite vertical tail and wing. The
.P	 fuel conservative program includes (1) expansion of the vertical
tail flight testing program to include three major airframe
manufacturers, (2) extension of the vertical tail programs to
support the early production phase, and (3) construction and
service life testing of a composite fuselages section. The pre-
viously planned NASA program (vertical tail and wing) and items
(1) and (2) are included in the baseline program. Item (3) is
added in the bevel II program.
Proposed baseline funding for work on composites totals
$110 million through 1982 with an additio.-ial $70 million
allocated to Phase II that is also to terminate in 1982.
significant aspects of the composite program will be
available as early as 1982 for incorportion into the produc-
tion of derivative aircraft and are expected to yield 60
improvement in fuel-efficiency. Complete, benefits of the
composite structure yielding fuel savings of up to 12% can be
incorporated in production aircraft beginning in 1990..
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Probability of implementation of this program in
production aircraft is very high because (1) its definite
weight savings, (2) its potential to also reduce production
costs in the manufacture of aircraft and (3) the emphasis of
$	 this program on flight testing and implementation,
4.1.4	 Aerodynamics (Fuel--Conservative Transport)
This activity is directed at the evolutionary improve-
ment of aerodynamic design and the development of active con-
trols tec-hnology. NASA will continue to work closely with the
manufacturing industry to develop the aerodynamics technology
base for the design of fuel-conservative aircraft. Higher
aspect-ratio wings with lower sweep and improved airfoil
sections will be designed based on improved numerical methods
and the results of extensive wind tunnel tests. Critical
problems of active controls to permit designs 'with reduced
statLc stability margins will be addressed, Present ongoing
efforts will be intensified. It appears that specific fuel
consumption savings on the order of 10-20o are possible. How
much of this can be attributed to a more vigorous NASA program
is not clear.	 The airframe industry has had, in the last four
decades, a NASA (previously NACA) program fr3m which to draw
technological expertise-and its members strongly urge a continu-
ance of this source of improved technology. Strict allocation
of.benefits between NASA and industry is irrelevant. What is more
4--6
Turboprops
Preliminary performance calculations indicate that
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important is that joint efforts of NASA and industry can pro-
duce the technological base for more fuel-conservative aero-
dynamic designs. These technologies will be ready for applica-
tion to new designs in the early 1980's. It is possible that
some aerodynamic changes could be incorporated in the design
of derivatives of currently produced aircraft.
Industry places potential fuel savings from active
controls at 5% with an additional. 10% savings available
from better wing body integration and use of a super critical
wing having a refined airfoil shape, increased thickness,
greater span, higher aspect-ratio, higher design lift and 	 f
reduced sweepback.
f
Proposed funding for this activity totals $50 million
i
through 1982 of which $25 million is for flight tests, $10
million for aircraft design and wind tunnel tests and $15
t
million for component development.
The airframe representatives indicated very strong
agreement with the objectives, timetable and funding for this
program. Probability of implementation of this program is very
r
high. The degree of implementation is dependent on how strongly
the design objectives of the airframe manufacturers shift to-
r'	 ward fuel conservation.
fuel savings on the order of 15% may be associated with the
I;f
i
I	
^
I^
5% saving can be gained from improvements over'current core
engine technology. Many questions are unanswered with regard
to the performance of propeller--driven aircraft at speeds and
altitudes approaching those of current jet transprops. These
questions will be addressed in preliminary phases of a program
aimed at demonstration of a reliable turboprop propulsion
system. Work through an engine demonstration phase represents
the baseline program. included are investigations of propeller
aerodynamics and structure/propeller/airframe integration,
configuratidn, and gears and controls as well as ground tests.
A flight demonstration using a transport aircraft is included in
F	 the Level II program.
Level I funding totals'$75 million through 1982 and
will determine the viability of the turboprop propulsion con-
cept for a high--altitude high-(subsonic) Mach-number passenger
transport. Positive results in the baseline program may lead to a
Level II flight demonstration requiring $50-million for a four-
year program ending in 1984.
The enthusiasm for the turboprop concept by the
representatives of the airframe manufacturers came as somewhat
of a surprise. The problems of vibration, noise and possible
speed restrictions were brought out; nevertheless, the en-
couragement came for the high potential fuel conservation.
t,
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couragement was given for accelerating the program if it is
It that the previously mentioned technical, problems could
solved.
Under an accelerated program it a;s pvss^ble that a
rboprop powered aircraft in the short range category could
developed for the short range market that will begin to
velop in 1985. While interest is high in turboprops, the
obability of implementation is still rather low, mainly as
result of concern over the question of airline and passenger
ceptance of propeller aircraft.
4.1.6
	
Laminar Flow Control,
t:
One of the technology elements with the greatest
I;
1, potential for fuel savings is drag reduction by laminar flow
3.
I; control.	 The'concept is to remove the surface boundary layers
I ` by suction-in order to maintain laminar flow and the low drag
associated with such flow.	 Potential fuel savings range from
E
a low of 20% to a high of 40%. 	 This has been a tantalizing
research area for some time.
	 Previous efforts b
	
y the Air Force
1'! and Northrop on the X-21 research aircraft did demonstrate the
I' possibility of flow l.aminarization but did not ans-er the . open
questions concerning structural concepts, pumping systems,
maintainability and reliability. 	 Recent.progress in materials
and structures have encouraged NASA to ]?ropose a $100 million
activity in laminar flow control through 1985.	 The activity
.:
t.'
ranges front the study of aircraft concepts and aerodynamics ta..
i
flight tests and in-service validation. However, the devel.op-
meat risk is.substantial, Tt app-ears to be a most appropriate
I
government R&D investment because although the potential public
benefit is great, the risk of failure is too high to justify:
investment by the manufacturing industry , particularly in the.
1
current economic environment.
The response of airframe manufacturers was unified in
emphasizing that if you laminarize the boundary layer you reduce
drag and improve fuel efficiency but that this must be done in
a manner that must not be overwhelmed by increased capital cost
and/or increased maintenance costs. One manufacturer suggested
that almost half of the fuel savings could be gai.ned from
aerodynamic design of a laminar flow wing without suction.
! if laminar flow control is to become available, it
seems unlikely before 1990. Even then the probability of
implementation is lowest of any of the technology programs
proposed primarily because of the potentially difficult main--
E:
tenance problem.
4.2	 Likely Combinations of Technology in operational
^. Aircraft
While hundreds of possible combinations of the above
technology activities exist, most of them are non-compatible.
For-example, a fuel--conservative engine and turboprop in con--
..
	
	 junction with laminar flow control appear to be an unlikely
combination of technologies to be implemented on the same air--
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craft. other combinations lead to at best a multiplicative 	 f
i
(percent of a reduced base) savings rather than a straight
summation of fuel saving percentages. 	 l
The introduction date of derivative and new aircraft 	 !^	 3
that incorporate fuel conservative market-ready technology is 	 iI
dependent on both the availability of the technology and the
market for such aircraft type in the airline industry.	 I
Assuming various levels of success of the NASA program
^e
yield,, a tree of possible implementation scenarios as depicted
in Figure 4.1. Branches of the tree 'are formed at times of
t
revaluation of the program. The major branch points will occur
s
at time of the following decisions:
a1 go or no-go with turboprops
o g6 or no--go with the development of a production
fuel-conservative engine
0 go or no-go with implementation of LFC
0 possible federal policy directives on short range
'a
air travel.
Numerous nodes are also depicted on the fuel-conservative
transport scenario tree. Each node represents a potential
derivative or new fuel-conservative aircraft. Listed for each
node are (a) the most likely time for introduction into revenue
producing service of a fuel-conservative transport. that ;.icludes
the sum of the technologies listed on each upstream node,
I
`r
l
1•
{
!j
95	 1
 ..----------.1	 95
395	 SMR +
	 1	 its	 SR+
	
r- 	FCB. 1 /2 Comp 1'^	 1C_ '^	 ;
	
!	 10, 4	 Z.----------.....1 s
	
5.0
Year of ;ntroduction	 Included in	 ts
i19	 )	 'most prob, scenario 	 i	 .1
' - 
	
MR + 1/6 Coup	 85	 LR + 1/5 Comp	 R7	 5R+	 54	 1 SR +	 1 i	 95
t^
F—d1/
2 Engine, 1/3 Acro	 0	 1 /2 Enq. i / 2 Aero	 125	 T/P 	 80M 	 1/2 Caz+p I-- - 100 	*&FC
 
0.9
	! 	 ! 7 , q	 5 .0
c
.h	
~	 32	 /MR +	 90	 14R
b 
f.:'	 o	 Passed in most -	
Corn
i
_	
N pro . scenario	 160	 l /4 Aero + S/2 	 205	 ?/P, 1/2 Camp
	
f4l S /M/LRn-^--13,n
	 22,+^	 Path Palloaed by
	
!	 most prob. scenario'
 IA
	 Current Engine
- - 
----------J :
	
i. .» .... "!
	
f ---I
 
135	 LR +	 90	 1 LR +	 Z	 !!!	 95	 ILP- 1	 45LR+
 230 - Acro, 1/2 Comp »-^q-- 	 70 	 I 1/2 Camp	 115	 ICF.	 i+10	 LFC
0,15i0.15	 .------.10.5	 L---.!	 G,20
t 	 1	 5	 !mental fuel savings S/F1R, LR (t)
	
Pt	 95	 S LR + i /	 I	 rL	 200	 + 1/2 COMPI--r. :01115 
Path by-passed	 4,20	 L-	 -----( 	 ,;	 L--J
by most prob. scenario
' Incremental eosr	 w	 t I^------^- °`-J
	
^o NASA	 1 !
(millions of dollars)	 5ILA+ E
	
100	 1 LFC I	 `
	
1	 {
.;	 0,20	 L+-dJ
i
ism
Aero: Aorodaynam^cs and Active Cantrclu
(Fuel conservative Transport) 	 most probable scenario
ramp: Composite Structure, Wing, Tail 6-
Fuseingc	 ----- other possible cambAn>ations-
=CE a Fuel Conservative Engine
	
le	 ?mp-cved Engine Core
	
LFC	 - nminax Flo-, Control
I L ''
	
	 LR	 Lra; R,n^^ Aircraft	 Totals are simple sums of downstream Clements.
5/MR: Shart tc Medium Range Aircraft
TIP : Turboprop
1/3, 3/4 Aero: Partial us^ of Active Controls and 	 -
Drag Clean-Up
1/5, 1/S Comp : Composite use in Secandary•Structuro
1/2 corps Composite Structure. Wing F ;.ail
Only
	
2 En	 Engine !lodo3/	 g :  g	 _
1
Figure 4.1 Fuel Conservative Aircraft Scenarios	 ';
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(b)	 the incremental cost of the NASA program to develop the 3^
i
incremental technology denoted on the node and 	 (c) the
.xpected incremental savings in fuel consumption.
I^
From this tree a most likely scenario for the intro- r	 i 4
duction of derivative and new aircraft in all three range
categories was selected.
4.2.1	 Baseline Scenario - The Fleet.Withou •t	 a NASA R&D
-	
•
Program
'I
' Given that the airframe industry	 i tself will reorient
z
its design of derivative aircraft toward fuel conservation as
a result of pressures from the airline industry ever_ without
• "
_
a NASA fuel-conservative technology program the likely baseline
i
scenario incl. tides the future availability 'of more fuel-
efficient aircraft.	 it is expected that market forces will
lead to the introduction of a derivative medium range aircraft
in about 1981 that is a replacement for the three engine narrow f
body -turbofan aircraft.	 in 1985,	 a market should develop for a;
derivative long range aircraft that would begin to replace
current four engine wide-body aircraft. 	 without a NASA program,
it seems unlikely that a market would develop for a derivative
short range aircraft.
E
Given the potential rate of technological development
without the NASA program, which as mentioned previously is
very difficult to estimate, it is likely that the medium range
{
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tbaseline derivative appearing in 1981 would include some engine
improvements
	 (10-tan engine),	 composite secondary, structures,
active controls and wing aerodynamics to total about 8% savingsy ^
:5 {
over that of present medium range narrow , bodv three-engine
turbofan aircraft. 	 In 1985 a baseline long range derivative
may be expe.ted to include all of the improvements included in fi	 s
the medium range derivative plus additional composites to
`k
result in a potential 9% fuel savings. 	 (See-Table 4.1)
s
4.2.2	 Most Probable Scenario 	 - The Fleet with the NASA
°t	 R&D Program
While numerous possible scenarios of derivative and
new aircraft introductions exist, the need for new aircraft by
the airlines and the probable availability dates of compatible
fuel conservative technologies yield the most likely scenario.
With respect to aircraft type, derivative and new aircraft
included:
Short Range: A first generation new aircraft prompted
Table 4.1
	
Baseline Scenario
Type of Aircraft
Range Derivative New
Short none none
Medium 1981;	 8% fuel saving composites
(2.5%) 1	wing aerodynamics	 (2%) none
active controls	 (2%),	 engine	 (2%)
Long 1985,	 9% feel savings composites
(3.5%)	 wing aerodynamics	 (2%) none
active controls	 (2%) ,	 engine	 (2 Q)
3
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by the availability_of turboprops would appear in 1987.	 sit
turboprops..are best suited for short range application it sE
possible that development would be accelerated slightly in
order to meet the market demand appearing in the mid-198.0's.
In addition to turboprops this aircraft could incorporate
aerodynamic improvements including active controls and some
primary composite structure.
	 Total likely fuel savings woui
reach 35% above present two-engine narrow-body turbofan
aircraft.
Additional development!, is turboprop core technol.oc
} and composite structures would lead to the development by 15
of a second generation new short range aircraft capable of z
45%fuel economy above present two-engine narrow-body turbos
- aircraft.	 (See Table 4.2.)
Medium Range:
	
Potential advances in composites wot
probably delay the introduction of a medium range derivative
^ aircraft b	 oneY	 Year until 1982 and result in an l$a fuel
economy over present-day three-engine narrow-body jets.
	 Thy
improvement results from current engine developments
	 (50),
composites
	 (6o),-active controls	 (4%)	 and wing aerodynamics
The market for a new medium range aircraft should
y
95 q'..
an
1d
S
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?	 develop by.19.98 to take advantage of turboprop propulsion (200)
as well as improved core design (50) active controls.and wing
	 °.
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Table 4.2	 The Fuel--Conservative Fleet
Type o£ Aircraft
Derivative NewRange
Short 1987*;	 35% fuel. savings 1995**; 45%	 fuel savings
turboprops	 (25%), aero- turboprops and improved
dynamics and active
control	 (8e)	 composites
core	 (30%)
aerodynamics	 (5%)
(8%) composites	 (12%)
Medium 1982;	 18% fuel savings 1995; 45% fuel savings
current engine	 (5%), turboprop and improved
composites	 (6%)	 aerody- core	 ,30%), aerodynamics
namics and active control and active controls
(8%) (8%),	 composites	 (12%)
Long 1985;	 24% fuel savings 1995;	 453	 fuel savings
current engines	 -(53) laminar flow control
active controls
	 (43) and aerodynamics 	 (303)
aerodynamics and laminar composites	 (123)	 fuel
wing	 (9 g )	 composites	 (83) conservative engine	 (10%)
*	 first generation r.ew aircraft in short range
**	 second generation new aircraft in short range
i
aerodynamics 17%) and primary structure composites •(12%) to
a
yield a 45- more efficient aircraft.
Long Range: A market for a derivative long range 	 s
aircraft appears in the mid-1980 s (1985) and would achieve
'	 fuel savings as indicated from some primary structure com-
osites (8a• ) active controls (4^) current engineBane improvements
a
(5b) and a laminar wing with improved wing aerodynamics (9a),
yielding a 24% more fuel efficient 'Long range transport over
present-day four-engine wide-body aircraft,
s
A new Long range aircraft appearing in the mid--1990's
	 e
^	 (1995) could be 45% more fuel efficient than current wide-body
f
Il;
s.
ircraft. This would result primarily from the successful
evelopment of laminar flow control. (30%) plus primary com-
t
osite structure (12%) other improved aerodynamics (active
ontrols) (4%) and a fuel-conservative engine development (10%).
bviously, significant improvement over the derivative aircraft
equires the successful development of laminar flow control.
See Fable 4. 2;)
Introduction dates for derivative aircraft were
alecLed subject to:
a availability of fuel conservative technology`
1
a airline industry markets for repla , ement aircraft
a consideration of the airframe industry's tendency 	 j
not to simultaneously develop aircraft in more
than one range category,
ntroduction dates for new aircraft considered only items (1)
zd (2) above since the nominal year of introduction (1995) is
•	 1
far in the future.
z,
FF.
!	 -
0
5.0
	 PREDICTED FUEL CONSUMPTION
5.1	 The Aircraft Replacement Model
The method for estimating the replacement of the
existing fleet by new aircraft and the fuel consumed follows thc
same general approach as several previous studies of future fleet
requirements. The first :step is to forecast the demand For air
travel in terms of revenue passenger miles (RPM). in this study
we forecast RPM's for U.S. carriers for domestic operations only.
International RPM's for U.S. carriers are assume.t to remain a
constant 250 of domestic RPM's through 2005. This demand was
divided into s,iort, medium, and long range categories. The
number of aircraft in each category was calculated from the
formula
	 RPM
N =
PROD x LF
where N is the number of aircraft, LF is the average load factor,
and PROD is the average aircraft productivity in seat/miles per
year. Aircraft were assumed to be retired after a fixed lifetime
and new aircraft were added as required to meet the demand.
For each type of aircraft, annual fuel consumption was
4
calculated from
$	 GAS. = GSM, x RPM. / LF
where GAS. is the annual fuel consumption in gallons and GSM, is
the gallons consumed per seat--mile for aircraft type i.
-There are several parameters used in this model.
'(1)	 The growth rate for forecasting travel demand. ?^
(2)	 The division of travel demand and fleet for
-
short, medium,	 and lone range.
(3)	 The average productivity and fuel consumption
i'
(gallons per seat-mile)
	 for each aircraft type.
r ^i.
(4)	 The scenario by which-new aircraft are intro-
I
}
duced;	 that is, year of introduction and percent
fuel savings. f
(5)	 The load factor.
(6)	 The deprediation lifetime. }f
Each of these is discussed below.
f
li
.::. 5.2 Model	 Parameters
5.2.1 Rate of Growth
Air travel was assumed to grow at a constant rate corn-
:;
pounded annually over the thirty year study period,
	 1975--2005.
I
This is a critical parameter which affects potential fuel, savings
_ Pexponentially. 1t is also an extremely uncertainY•	 	 parameter U°hick • '.	 !
-	 ? is affected by all sorts o•f exogenous events which cannot be pre-
dicted. Most analysts of the airline industry use values between
_	 E;5 41 and 7%.	 In this study,	 we have analyzed the fuel savings frlom
a conservative 3% to an optimistic 8a.	 In accordance with the an-
- alysis described in Section 3.2, the baseline case is taken as 4.2%.
i
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5.2.2
	 Division by Range ;..'
Both air travel demand and the domestic airline fleet
were divided into short, medium, 	 and long range.	 The choice of
' these categories was based on the analysis of operating data from
the Civil Aeronautics Board	 (CAB),	 These data showed that the
average stage lengths of mc g t aircraft fall into three relatively
widely separated groups.
	 Long range is defined as average stage
length over 900 miles and includes the wide body jets 	 (B-747,
L' DC-10,	 L-101.1),	 four engine turbofans	 (B-707,	 DC-8,	 B-720),	 and
I
about 604 of four engine turbojets	 (B-707,	 DC-8,	 8--720,	 CV-880).
Short range is defined as average stage length less than 500
miles and includes two engine turbofans
	 (8-737, DC-9 and BAC-111)
and turboprops.	 Medium range denotes average stage length between
500 and 900 miles;
	 this category includes
	
three engine turbofans
(B-727)	 and about 40% of the four engine turbojets. 
In 1974,	 the breakdown of domestic air travel demand
by RPM was approximately 50% long range,
	 35% medium range,
	
and
15% short range.	 These percentages were assumed to remain the
same over the thirty year period examined-
p
Aircraft Operating Cost and Performance Report, Civil
Aeronautics Board,	 June,	 1974.
a
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5.2.3	 oyerating Data
As suggested above, six different aircraft types were
identified: wide--body jets, four engine turbofans, ' three engine
turbofans, .two engine turbofans, four engine turbojets and
turboprops. Each type aircraft was defined by two parameters:
(a) productivity in seat-miles/year. This is the
product of block speed (miles/hour), capacity
(seats), and utilization (operating hours/year).
(b) fuel consumption (gallons/seat-mime).
These parameters were determined by weighted averages
of CAB operating data. For purposes of this study, productivity
is not especially critical since it does not affect total fuel
consumption. It does, however, affect the number of aircraft in
'	 each category, • and thus, it can be used as a check on the projections.
r
Lssentially•the model forecasts the number of passenger--miles, which
when divided by load factor become seat-miles, and multiplied by
^b
fuel consumption become gallons of fuel. Productivity only affects
the way these seat-miles are "packaged" into aircraft.
5.2.4	 Scenario for New Aircraft
New aircraft are defined by three parameters: in addit-on
r
to productivity and fuel consumption, one must specify the year
of introduction. Since productivity has no effect on total fuel
consumed, it was assumed constant for each of the three range
categories except for the new long range aircraft for which it
was assumed to increase by 20% due to higher seating capacity.
Thus the two key parameters are fuel consumption (GSM) and year
of introduction (ZY). Three types of "new" aircraft are used to
fill the gap in travel demand:
(a) Continuing production of existing aircraft. For
Jong range, this is assumed to be the wide--bodies:
for medium range, three engine turbofans; and for
short range, two engine turbofans.
(b) Derivatives which include evolutionary improve-
ments to existing models and
(c) New aircraft which incorporate the results of the
proposed research program.
Two scenarios were considered. The first incorporates 	 E
4
fuel conservAtion technology that would be introduced by the air-
frame and engine manufacturers without the NASA research program.
I
Essentially, this is technology which is ready for implementation
at the present time. This scenario is given below:
1 1__ MJ 'ILL
The second scenario incorporates th-e.fue1 . saving tech-
nology of-.'the NASA research. programs,
zY AGSM.
Short Range New 87
New 95 -45% (from 1975)
S Medium, Range Derivative 82 --18%
New 90 -45%
	 (from 1975)
Long Range Derivative 85 -24%
New 95 --45-0	 (from 1975)
The development of this scenario is discussed more fully
in Section 4-2-
5.2.5. Load Factor
We have assumed an average load factor of 55% in this 3
analysis, but.also show the effect of alternate assumptions of	 j
average load factors up to 65 %.	 It is necessary to explain
these assumptions, particularly in light of recent lower industry
average load factors 152.7 percent averaged over the last ten
i'	 .
years, and 51.2 percent averaged over the past five). A briefS.'
background discussion is appropriate.
i
In 1971 the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) reviewed load
factors that had been experienced by the industry and decided that
basing fares on actual load factors contributed to over-capacity.
;',.	 As load factors declined (and they did so during the late 1960's)
, 
, 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
J __ ~l __ _ 
(causing mo.re service to ::'e added), and by driving away passengel':s. 
This required further fare increases. The CAB reasoned that by 
instituting a "standard" load factor for fare setting purposes -
they chose 55 percent -that break even load factors would flO longer 
d"ecline and the downward trend in capacity utilization would be 
halted. 
The policy had its intended effect of stopping the down-
ward trend in load factors • Nevertheless, the carr~ers continued 
to operate nearer to breakeven load factors of 50-52 percent than 
to the profitable load factors of 55 percent envisioned by the 
* CAB. 
Several trends are manifesting themselves now, and all 
tend to increase load factors. The first is pressure on the CAB 
to limit both aircraft fuel consumption and further tare increases 
by taking steps to improve aircraft occupancies. A proceeding is 
now under way to consider raising the load factor standard to 60 
or 65 percent. for fare setting pur~~ses. Very likely the more 
~oderate 60 percent standard will be adopted -at this level few 
can co~plain of high incidences of sold out flights. Even at 65 
percent, with some fare-based incentives to smooth the demand, 
adequate service is provided. Al though a 60 percent standard 
would not necessarily produce 60 percent load factors (for reasons 
* The discrepancy is causeu ;,y the c"rriers' propen-
sity to adr'" services ,·,henever a profitable opportunity appears 
- and the profitability neeu not be nearly as high as the 12 
percent return on investment that enters into the CAB'R deter-
mination of the proper fare for a 55% load factor. 
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}	 explained in the footnote), it would raise load factors to 55
"'.	 percent, or greater.
The second factor entering into higher load factors is
the growing use of discount fares by carriers as a tool both for
building traffic and smoothing demand variations. This has the
'a
effect of raising load factors because breakeven load factors in-
crease (the average passenger fare is less than before). 	 Since
the fare setting process is based on standard loads at normal
(undiscounted) fares, the increased proportion of discount passen-
gers tends to push load factors up toward or even beyond the
CAB's standard, which we believe will soon be 60%.
A further upward push on average load factors is the
recently approved operation of one stop tour'charters. These
flights, by definition, fly at 1000 load factor, both stimulating
some new traffic	 (because of reduced fares) and diverting some of
it from scheduled service.	 It is too early to measure the popu--
larity of these charters,	 their impact on average fares,	 total
demand, scheduled services,	 and average load factors.	 European
experience with a similar concept suggests a very large potential
s-
s-	 13 market, but it may be argued that Americans may not readily accept
As breakeven load factors increase, load factors
must increase, even if new traffic did not appear. In such a
case more flights would lose money, and carriers would begin
to reduce their schedules, raising average load factors. Of
course, if enough new traffic appears, this will raise load
factors without schedule cutbacks.
1
„i
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the very low cost ground accommodations on which low cost incla-
sive tours are based.	 it is also questionable wh-_-,ther as many
opportunities exist to create low cost domestic destinations as
is the case in the Mediterranean. 	 Certainly some allowance must
be made for an impact of the long-delayed tour charter into the
U.S. domestic market — the only question is how much.
	 The fore-
cast of declining yields per passenger is based partly on the
growth of the charter proportion of air traffic, and to he con-
sistent, we should adjust average load-factors upward.
Taking all . of the factors mentioned above into account,
we must pos y
 the likelihood of average load factors being not the
'standard'	 55 percent 10 years hence, but somewhere in the vicinity
of 60%.	 For these reasons we have uonsidered 60% as an alternate
to the 55 percent load factor widely accepted by airlines, air-
craft manufacturers, and until now the CAB for planning
?'4 purposes.
5•.2.6
	 Aircraft Replacement
In this analysis we have assumed that aircraft in the
existing fleet are retired after 15 years in service. 	 This is
certainly a simplification of a complex picture, yet it is based
on considering the whole picture.
	 We do not rest on an assump-
;P
. Lion that aircraft serve out their "depreciation lifetimes" and
then are replaced.
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' First of all, it should be stated that under continuing
maintenance cycling, aircraft have an indefinitely long physical
lifetime.	 DC-3 1 s originally introduced in the 1930s, DC-6 1 s and
DC--7 1 s of the	 1940's and 195O's are still	 flying in scheduled
ai.-line service in parts of the world, while the 707's introduced
in the late .1950s in the U.S.
	 are nowhere near	 "wear-out".	 Air--
lines contemplating keeping some of their 707's in service past J
7
F
. i
60,000 service hours
	 (about 20 years)
	
are now planning some struc-
tural reworkings that may cost about	 $250,000 per plane 	 (vi. the '#
current purchase price of about $10 million).	 This will extend their K	 y
!., potential
	 airworthiness at least 20,000 hours, or about 7 years.
Other jet aircraft are not known to require even such minor struc--
i;
tural reworkings.	 Apart from structure, maintenance cycle costs
'	 ? are a year-in, year--out function of aircraft usage, rather than '	 J
..= age-, so there is never an advantage to replacing an gld aircraft
F. with a newer one of the same design.
u
.. Secondly, we should consider financial lifetime - in the Y
sense of the duration of tax benefits.
	 Airlines,	 as do other com-
panies, normally receive an investment tax.credit upon puzche.sej
e
1
of an aircraft.
	 They are also allowed to depreciate their F
equipment over a six to eight year lifetime for tax purposes, on
i 	 E
i	
L
` an accelerated schedule for -.he first several of these years
In some cases this may pass to a bank or a leasing
'
_
company, which is of no consequence in this context.
4
z
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("double declining balance method"). After this time tax savings
for the purchase of these aircraft end, but if new replacement
aircraft are purchased, the tax benefits begin again. If this
were the dominant factor, aircraft would be replaced every six
to eight years.
	 Clearly they are not, but the tax considera-
tions are an incentive that certainly enters the total evaluation
of aircraft replacement. It should be mentioned that the "boot:
depreciation" period of 12 to 16 years is separate from the tax
depreciation matter, and will be considered below.
Thirdly, we must consider technological lifetime, mean-
i.ng,in thc-- broad sense, the period over which an airline feels
it has the best available aircraft to suit its needs. When a
new aircraft type enters the picture, the old one is "obsolete"
to the extent that the airline prefers tha new one for whatever
reason: seating capacity, range, appearance, operating cost, or
some combination. This is the real driving force behind air-
craft replacement, pushed, as the case may be, by tax consider-
atiohs, and restrained, in some cases, by lack of funds. But
when funds are not the governing restraint, an airline may phase
in and phase out a fleet of aircraft *.,.thin relatively few years.
American Airlines, for example, took delivery of the BAC--111 in
If this were to be typical, airlines would provably
lease out their old aircraft for a number of years rather than
selling them, in order to avoid paying taxes on large sales
receipts relative to depreciated values.
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1966, and had replaced them all by 1973; they received their
720-B's in 1961, and had replaced all but a few by 1971. united
received its 727 'Quick Change' aircraft in 1966--67, and is
currently phasing them out; and it had replaced its 1967. fleet of
Caravelles by 1972. The 747's, to a degree, replace 707's and
DC-8's that range from 15 down to only seven or eight years old,
and now, only five years after introduction, these 747's are being
replaced in some cases by DC--10's and L-1011's. Manufacturers are
in business to make old aircraft obsolete by whatever combination
of appeals will best serve the purpose. Certainly economy of
operation is one such appeal, as well as other features such as
seating, flexibility, and range. Manufacturers, of course, have
their own concept development, engineering, marketing, and pro-
duction cycles governed by their own investment considerations,
but they usually have new product concepts in readiness whenever
they feel the market is ripe.
This. of course, ?-ring s into question the ability of th e
airlines to finance new fleets 
—especially given the poor fi-
nancial health of some carriers. A carrier has available to it
three sources of funds: internally generated funds, debt, and
equity. The internal funds come frc-r profits, plus revenues
designated as "^epreciation " rather than labeled as "profits".
(This is the "book depreciation" — usually an annual 1/12th to
1/15th of the purchase price down to some small residual value.)
L
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AWall Street Journal, August 21, 1975.
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Depreciation of domestic fleets accounts for about $750 million
in funds annually, but profits fluctuate widely. In 1974 all
U.S. carriers together earned $321 million after taxes, but in
1975 losses are projected at $300 million, and these are expected
to double in 1976.	 Obviously, internal furls for equipment pur-
chase are not accumulating rapidly under current conditions - but
current conditions cannot continue. Most likely the current
problems, which are primarily traceable to fuel cost increases,.
plus excessive ordering of new aircraft when the country was
heading into a recession, will work themselves out in a few years.
If not, it seems almost inevitable that through industry restruc-
turing, deregulation, or subsidy, the industry will return to
generating "normal" amounts of internal funds, so that on the
order of $1 billion to $1.5 billion annually will become available.
Some of these funds, of course, must be used to.purchase other
equipment and facilities, and some used for dividends, but possibly
$500 to $750 milliun would remain for aircraft inv^atments.
Debt financing provides a second source of funds, which
on an industry basis provides as much or 'more funding than the
internal funds. In view of the dubious value of Pan Am's F.nd
Eastern's debt, banks and insurance companies are currently wary
c»f lending to the weaker airlines. Nevertheless, it seems reason-
able to assume that either the weak airlines will be strengthened
sr
t
j
41
soon by acquisition or the Government will underwrite the!. debt. t
Very likely, under these circumstances, debt will continue to
provide the order of $1 billion annually in aircraft financing
capability.
F
.A third funding source is equity. For the strongest
}	 airlines, such as Delta and Northwest, raising funds by issuance
.	 t
of stock is feasible but unnecessary.' The stock of other carriers
	 i
is currently selling well below book values, so that it is very
?'.	 unattractive for most airlines to raise capital in this manner.
lWhile conditions may chan(je, this is the least certain source of
y	 funds, and is probably best ignored.
	
J,
Of course aircraft need not be purchased by airlines ---
third parties can lease them to the carriers, and frequently do.
(The third parties are often subsidiaries of banks or insurance
companies.) The major concern of the owning partied is obtain-
:
	
	 ing sufficiently long leasing lifetime to justify the investment,
	
i
which is similar to the airlines' own criteria. Leasing sources
may be expected to have very large funding available provided
R:	 that the long terra picture of the industry improves.i.
i
Taking the funds directly available to the airlines,
-	 t
as stated above, complete fleet replacement can occur in 12-15
years, and leasing parties potentially will provide further funds
if weak participants are absorbed or and^.rwritten.
Summarizing the above discussions, we might say that
it is safe to assume that aircraft replacements will occur after
	
i
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15 years service life, but that with the aggressive product
development and marketing of aircraft manufacturers, 10-12 years
is probably a better assumption. Use cf such a shorter replace-
ment cycle would bring new aircraft on-stream sooner and, if
these aircraft are fuel conservative, generate larger fuel savings
than with a 15--year r(-placement cycle.
5.3
	
Results
5.3.1	 Baseline
For the baseline case, a relatively conservative
growth rate cf 4.2% per year was chosen as discussed previously.
The load factor was taken as 55% and aircraft lifetime 15 years.
With these assumptions (for the U.S. domestic and U.S. interna'-
tional operations) the cumulative fuel consumed to 2005 is 332.6
f, illion gallons with the NASA program, and 422.9 billion gallons
without, a savings of 90.3 billion gallons or 21% over the'
thirty--year period. By 2005 the annual fuel consumption is
13.9 billion gallons with the NASA program and 23.0 without, a
saving of 9.1 billion gallons or 40% annually. Total fuel
consumed under both scenarios and fuel savings, annual and
cumulative, are shown in Table 5.1. Figure 5.1 illustrates
the jet fuel. consumed by the U.S. domestic and international
commercial air transportation fleet with and without the im-
petus of the NASA sponsored fuel. conservative technology pro-
gram, and its relationshi p to the current rate of U.S.
W(g
{. is{
}
x:.
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Table 5.1
	
Future Fuel Consumption and Savings
Fuel Consumption With NASA auel Consumption Without Fuel Savings
R&D in billions of gallons NASA R&D in billions in billions
of gallons of gallons
Year Per Year Cumulative Per Year Cumulative Per Cumu-Year lative
1976 B.Oa 8.08 8.08 8.08 -- --	 y
1977 8.34 16.42 8.34 16.42 -- - - E
1978 8.66 25.08 8.66 25.08 -- --
p
;
1979 8.98 34.06 8.98 34.06 - --
a19BO 9.30 43.36 9.30 43.36 -- --
1983 9.65 53.01 9.61 52.97 -.04
-.04
1982 9.85 62.86 9.94 62.91 .09 .05
1983 10.10 72.96 10.3 73.21 .20 .25
1984 10.36 83.32 10.68 83.69 .31 .56
1985 10.42 93.74 13.00 94.89 .57 1.13
1986 10.55 104.29 11.36 106.25 .81 1.94
1987 10.69 114.98 11.68 117.93 .99 2.93
1988 11.04 126.02 12.19 130.12 1.15 4.OB
1989 11.40 137.42 12.66 1.42.78 1.26 5.34
1990 11.49 148.91 13."10 155.88 1.59 6.93
1991 11.69 160.6 13-59 169.47 1.90 8.83
1992 11.94 172.54 14.09 183.56 2.15 10.98
1993 i1.94 184.48 14.58 198.14 2.64 13.62
1994 11.95 196.43 15.06 213.20 3.11 16.73
1995 11.69 208.12 15.62 228.82 3.94 20.67
1996 11.58 219.70 16.2 245.02 4.62 25.29
1997 11.62 231.32 16.82 261.84 5.20 30.49
1998 11.81 243.13 17.47 279.31 5.69 36.18
1999 11.92 255.05 18.18 297.49 6.25 42-44
2000 12.10 267.15 18.91 316.40 6.81 49.25
2001 12.32 279.47 19.66 326.06 7.34 56.59
2002 12.69 292.16, 20.45 356.51 7.76 64.35
2003 `	 13.09 305.25 21.26 377.77 8.17 72.52
2004 i	 13.45 318.70 22-12 399.8'9 8.67 81.19
2005 13.88 332.58 23.00 422.89 9.12 90.31
?f
7
x
h s
7
a
^l
i
i
i -
j
: -9
j
i
t
's
j
1
9
i
3.00
al
41
kt
1:0
O
1.0
11.)75  U.S. Con ,;uml f ion
All Petroleum Products
1976	 1981	 1986	 1991	 1996	 2001
	 2005
Yva r
Fiquro 5.1	 Fliol U.--cd by t ho U.S. Domost i c and
I it L L , v n,i I i o it a I A i. i.- L ra it s 1) (-) r t P I o o t
I_ I_. _1
	 I	 1	 I	 ;	 l
consumption of petroleum products.	 While the U.S. rate of
j consumption of energy tram all sources will increase in this
time period,	 the rate of consumption of petroleum products may
actually decrease as a result of the use of substitute energy
l sources and conservation measures.	 Figure 5.2 is a plot of
the fuel savings over the thirty year period.
It is estimated that the aircraft 	 fleet	 (U.S.	 domes--
: tic and U.S.	 international)	 in 2005 will number 3559 with the
NASA program and 3696 without,	 a difference of 137 which is
due to the greater productivity assumed for the new long range
aircraft.	 By range category, the fleet breaks down as follows:
With NASA	 Without NASA
Program	 Program
Long Range	 716	 826
Medium Range	 1472	 1472
Short Range	 659	 659
Projected replacement is slightly less than 10% of the
fleet annually; net change in the fleet is about 3.5% annually.
L
	
	
The remaining paragraphs in this section quantify the
sensitivity of these projections to each of several critical
parameters.
t
5.3.2	 Rate of Growth
Fuel savings were calculated for a range of growth
rates from 3% to 8%. The results are presented in Table 5.2
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Table5.2 Variation in Fuel Consumption
with Rate of Growth ,	 gal.x109
Growth With NASA Without NASA Percent
Rate Program Program savings savings
Cumulative	 (1975--2005)
.03 284.80 356.16 71.36 20.1
.042* 332.59 422.89 90.31 21.4
.05 390.30 504.78 114.48 22.7
.06 460.19 605.12 144.94 23.9
.07 545.00 728.44 183.44 25.1
•08 648.19 880.20 232.01 26.3
Annual	 (2005)
. 03 10.39 17.21 6.82 39.6
.042* 13.88 23.00 9.12 39.7
.05 18.46 30.65 12.19 39.8
.06 24.50 40.74 16.24 39.9
.07 32.42 53.99 21.56 39.9
.08 42.80 71.38 28.58 40.i,
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iand plotted in Figure 5.3. Basically, they indicate that
potential fuel savings increase exponentially wit'h growth rate:
cumulative savings range from 71.4 billion gallons at 3% to
„P
232.0 billion gallons at 8%; annual savings in 2005 range from
6.8 billion gallons at 3% to 28.6 billion gallons at 80. Per-
centage savings increase about 1.3 percentage points for each
point increas in growth rate for cumulative fuel consumed
(from 20% to 26%). Percentage fuel savings annually in 2005
k
are relatively constant with growth rate (at about 4006
5.3.3	 Load Factor Assumptions 	 `l
Because of the arguments presented earlier, fuel 	 s.
consumption for a range of load factors up to 65% were calcu-
lated- As expected, fuel consumption decreases with increasing
load factor from 90.3 billion gallons at 55% load factor to
82.9 billion gallons at 60%. Percentaci savings are relatively
constant at 21%. The results are shown in Table 5.3 and
plotted in Figure 5.4.
	
z	 ^
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5.3.4	 Year of Introduction
Sensitivity to delays in implementation of the fuel
conservative aircraft program were explored by calculating
fuel consumed if the NASA program were delayed by one year and
two year's. In this case, we assume the entire scenario was
delayed by a uniform amount: all derivative aircraft intro-
duced a year later and all new aircraft introduced a year later.	 k
tj
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The data are presented in Table 5.4 and plotted in Figure 5.5.
Basically each year delay causes an increase in fuel consump-
tion of about 8 billion gallons cumulatively and a correspond-
Ing decrease in fuel savings.
Sensitivity to the delay of acceleration of individual
aircraft was also examined. Delay of the long range aircraft
(scheduled for 1995) for one year would cost 1.7 billion gal-
lons over the period 1995-2005. Similarly, delay of the
medium range aircraft (scheduled for 1990) for one year would
cost 1.35 billion gallons from 1.990 to 2005. Delay of the
short range aircraft (scheduled for 1995) would cost .38 billion
gallons (1995--2005). Accelerating the schedule would save
corresponding amounts.
i	 5.3.5	 Gallons Per Seat-Mile
The objective of the NASA program is to achieve
reductions in specific fuel consumption for derivative and
.new aircraft (e.g., 45% in the new aircraft). Sensitivity of
the totals to shortfall of these target values of the NASA R&D
program was explored by calculating fuel consumed with a 5%
and 10% increase in specific fuel consumption of new aircraft
above the target values. Similarly, the savings which i7ould
result from surpassing the target goals by 5% and 10% were ex-
plored. The results are shoran in Table 5.5 and plotted in
Figure 5.6. An increase of 5% in fuel consumption above the
target values cosus about 9.5 billion gallons cumulatively
5•-25.
,; a
'	 .
5-26
Table 5.4 Variation of Fuel Consumption
with Year of Introduction, gal-x109
Without
With NASA NASA
	
Percent
	
Program	 Program	 Savings	 Savings
Cumulative (1975-2005)
On Schedule	 332.59	 422.89
	
90.31
	
21.4
Delay One Year	 341.45	 422.89	 81.52	 19.3
Delay Two Years	 349.39	 422.89	 73.59	 17.4
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Figure 5.5 Variation in Fuel savings with Year
of Introduction
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Table 5.6	 variation of Fuel Consumption
With Aircraft Lifetime,	 gal .^	 10^
Aircraft Without
Lifetime With NASA NASA Percent
(years) Program Program Savings Savings
Cumulative
15 332.59 422.89 90.31 21.4
18 345.65 425.51 79.86 18.8
20 348.79 426.55 77.76' 18.5
Table 5 . 5 Variation of Fuel Consumption With
Gallons Per Seat-Mile, gal.x109
Without
Gallons Per With NASA NASA Percent
Seat Mile Program Program Savings Savings
o Cumulative	 ( 1975-2005)
^+ 0
-'j
-10a 314.12 422.89 108.85 25.7
w	 -i P, --	 5% 323.12 422.89 99.85 23.6
7 Base 332.59 422.89 90.31 21.4G' 5% 342.06 422.89 80.91 19.1U 0
 
10% 352.00 422.89 70.98 16.8Q U
Annual	 (2005)
rq
r'? -100 12.52 23.00 10.48 45.5
ED 
w 5 - 5% 13.18 23.00 9.82 42.7
w z Base 13.88 23.00 9.12 39.7U r. 5% 14.56 23.00 8.44 36.7
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ovcr the 30-year period and about 680 million gallons annually
in 2005;	 an increase of 10% above the target values costs an-
other 10 billion gal l ons cumulatively and 740 million gallons
annually.	 Conversely,	 surpassing the'target values by 5a saves
9.4 billion gallons or about 700 million gallons in 2005.
5.3.6	 Aircraft Lifetime
s ensitivity to the as-umption of 15-year aircraft
lifetime was determined by calculating savings for 18 and 20
year lifetimes,	 respectively.	 As excepted,	 fuel consumption
increases with increasing lifetime, both with and without the
NASA program since older, 	 less ' tuel-efficient aircraft are re-
placed more slowly.	 Savings decrease	 from 90.3 billion gallons
with a 20-year lifetime.	 The data are shown in Table 5.6 and
plotted in Fiqure	 5.7.
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Figure 5.7 Variation of Fuel Savings with
Aircraft Lifetime
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	 BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE NASA FUEL
CONSERVATIVE AIRCRAFT TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM
6.1	 Benefits From U.S. Domestic Air Travel
Conservation goals are aimed at saving physical re-
sources. Therefore, dollar units by themselves may not be
appropriate measures of conservation benefits - especially
when the future valuation of price of the resource is subject
to great uncertainty. In order to put this uncertainty into
perspective, benefits are estimated in two ways; the first,
using traditional present value techniques under two different
pricing assumptions for jet fuel and for two corresponding
discount rates, 5% and 10%; the second, in terms of physical
resources, gallons of fuel, over the thirty year period.
Fuel savings are calculated by comparing fuel
consumption for two scenarios. The first assumes the fleet
that would be in existence with implementation of the NASA
program. The second includes expected technology advances and
fuel efficiency increases which would be achieved by private
industry without the NASA program. Therefore, the savings are
those attributable to the NASA program alone. The fuel savings
are shown in Figure 5.2. A conservative 4.2% growth in demand
is employod.
daily consumption of 17 million barrels per day for the total
U.S. economy for all uses of petroleum, this savings could
supply all U.S. needs for 107 days at the present Fate of con-
sumption, or could supply U.S. domestic passenger air transpor-
tation for more than eleven years at the current (1974) rate
of consun. :-.ion.
However, due to the long R&D lag inherent in the in-
dustry, benef i ts do n-t accrue in any substar.'ial amount until
after 1985. In present (1975) dollar terms the total benefits
over the life of the transferred technology are $9.4 billion.
(see Figure 6.1.) when the benefit from the U.S. international
sector (see Sec. 6.2) are added to the benefits obtained in the
U.S. domestic sector, the present value of the total gross bene-
fit from U.S. f •.el savings is $11.7 billion ($1975). These
benefits were derived by converting the physical fuel savings
to dollar values by assuming that by 1980 U.S. domestic jet
fuel prices would increase to the present international level
of 35 cents per gallon and thereafter would increase at an
annual rate of 7%. This fuel price increasR is in line ­ith a
discount rate of 10%. The combination of these two effects
implies that one gallon of jet fuel in 1985 has a present val,ie
($1975) of 18.9 cents; In 3.990, 16.5 cents; and ir. 2000, 12,5
cents. If on the other hand, it is assumed that the price of
jet fuel in the U.S. remains constant at 22 cents per gallon
through the year 2005, the present value of the benefit ($1375) 	 =s`
6-2
Figure 6.1 Benefits in Present Value Dollars of Annual Fuel
Saved in U.S. Domestic Operations
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accruing from savings in both U.S. domestic and international
commercial air operations is $2.7 billion at a 10`b discount
rate, and $6.4 billion at a 5% discount rate. This implies that
the present. value ($1975) of a gallon of jet fuel in 2000 is
2.0 cents at a discount rate of 10%.
The cost of the proposed baseline and Level II NASA
programs are $670 million to be allocated over a ten year period.
a
(See Figure 6.2.) At a 10% discount rate the total $670 mil.lign
program has a present value of $425 million ($1 ; 975). With the
assumption of increasing fuel prices as described above, the
pay--out period is 12 years for this investment and "break -even"
.-a
occurs in the yc:ar 1987. using an alternative prase inflation
of 2% beginning in 1980 and a discount rate of 5% causes dollar
benefits to increase to $11.5 billion ($1975) and the pay-out
period remains the same. Thesc benefit/cost streams imply a
benefit/cost ratio of approximately 20:1. However, this ratio
is only appropriate for the nation as a whole in terms of a fuel
conservation hypothesis since industry expenditures for bringing
the technology into commercial use have not been incorporated	 ^'
in the cod'* streams.
If, in 1985, 900,000 barrels/day of jet fuel were all
that were available, would the demand for air travel exceed
the supply?* The U.S. domestic fleet will require 530,000
* Project Independence Report, Federal Energy
Administration, November 1974.
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barrels/day and the U.S. international fleet will require another
130,000 barrels/day. This leaves approximately 240,000 barri.?s/
day to be spread among military, cargo, and other carriers. The
NASA program would provide a savings of 39,000 barrels/day
in the year 1985. The answer to the questions is that, without
significant acceleration, the NASA program will not solve the
problems now anticipated for 1985.
0
6.2	 U.S. international Travel
The dollar and. physical benefits shown above do not
include benefits from U.S. International travel. Based on the
assumption that U.S. International travel remains at 25% of
domestic air travel, the benefits would be increased by more
0
	
	
than $2.3 billion, for a total benefit of $11.7 billion. Re-
duced purchases of jet fuel of U.S. carriers in foreign ports
will be approximately offset by decreased purchases of foreign-
owned carriers in U.S. ports. Therefore, no additional balance
of payments effects are realized.
6.3
	
The U.S. Balance of Pavments Trade Flows
0
In 1973, aerospace exports were $5.2 billion and in 1974
were estimated at $7.0 billion,* which represents 70 of.dollar
exports (excluding milii-:ry aid). Moreover, 65% of all orders
0
for U.S. jet aircraft are foreign. This export strength is
*Aerospace Industry Survey, Standard & Poor, October
31, 1974.
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attributed to the "good buy" of American technology. 	 T£ this j
position is to be maintained, the manufacturers cannot rely on
favorable exchange rates	 (declining exchange value of the dollar)
i
to make our technology competitive.
The development of technology incorporated into air- !^
craft resulting in greater productivity is usually associated
with higher initial capital costs.	 In this study,	 the assume--
Lion has been made that new fuel efficient technology, while
b
lowering direct operating costs, would be offset** by increased
capital costs of aircraft.
Using the further assumption that,-for each aircraft
sold to a U.S.	 carrier,	 one additional aircraft is also sold
- to a foreign carrier	 (see Section 3. ,0	 U.S.	 engine and air-
frame manufacturers will show increased dollar exports
	 (over
the sale of an equivalent fleet of non-fuel-conservative
aircraft)	 equivalent to the dollar amount of fuel saved.
	 This
results in a balance of payments benefit of around $9 billion r
($1975).	 if only 50% of the potential savings are captured
(i.e., manufacturer and buyer share equally in the benefits) -j
then $4.5 billion	 ($1975)	 over the 20 year period 1985-2005
can be expected from increased exports.
	 These benefits are
excluded from the benefit streams in the above calculations
1
of cost/benefit ratios as they result from dollar flows and
not from fuel conservation.
**This is in terms of total expenditures on the fleet
and not on a single aircraft basis.
-.
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7.0 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONTINUING ASSESSMENTS
From the previous discussion of aircraft replacement
policies there is shown to be a continual process of planning
of research, development, marketing and production of aircraft.
The factors controlli •,g the replacement rates tend, in the
long run, to be the manufacturing industry's continuing ability
to make existing aircraft obsolete, and the airline industry's
ability to finance new aircraft.
To attain their objective of creating technological
obsolescence, the manufacturers give attention to many
elements:
a Present fleet composition
m Predicted future fleet and its composition by
size
a Substitutes for air travel (car, bus and train
economics)
0 Future maintenance requirements
0 Better aircraft performance and economics
0 Financial nealth of the airlines.
Fuel consumption will be 20% to 35% of direct operating cost,
depending on future fuel prices, and manufacturers will
address all these elements to gain reduced maintenance ccsts,
better utilization potential (through shorter turn-arounds
or all-weather capabilities), and better space utilization
(more seats or more cargo for a given aircraft size). In
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considering these elements together, the most profitable
price for aircraft may not embody the technology for minimum
fuel consumption although, with recent price increases, fuel
consumption is becoming a more important design-optimizing
factor.
However, with the NASA fuel conservative aircraft
program, industry will freight the fuel consumption element more
heavily than if "business-as-usual" economics of aircraft manu-
facturing and purchasing prevailed. Since the lead time for
incorporating the NASA R&D efforts is Jong, an ongoing assess-
ment of benefits and costs should be pursued. The NASA
program entails the planned expenditure of $670 million in a
ten year period to develop the technology for fuel conservation
,in air transportation. In the course of this program it may 
be assumed that some of the technology investments will mature
earlier or will be more successful in terms of performance
objectives than others. -Thus, it is important that NASA should
develop short run (two or three year) criteria for decision
snaking to enable the modification of the technolog y program to
capitalize upon successful. accomplishments. Neither the cost,
schedule, nor the technical objectives of these programs are
deterministic. Thus, the decision criteria should include the
analysis of the cost and schedule risk of each program element
as a function of technical objectives. This will serve to
identify initial decision nodes in the development process,
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as well as the trade--offs between technical objectives, and
cost and schedule. NASA will then be in a position to select
the technology mix, which Will yield the maximum fuel conservation
impact for a given level of expenditure. The following rela-
tionships need to be determined.
Time-Cost development trade--offs
This is necessary for determining whether any of
the technology programs can be accelerated.
Q Technology substitution trade-offs
This is necessary for incorporating accomplish-
ments into a "combined system s' for an attainable
aircraft.
a Airline economic trade-offs between on--hand air-
craft and new orders for aircraft
This is necessaiy to judge whether with derivative
and new generation aircraft the NASA supported
technology can be economically incorporated into
the airline fleet.
o Industry expenditures for support of NASA fuel
conse.•va ti ve aircraft program
This is necessary to judge the economic viability
of incorporating the technology into production
aircraft. Industry expenditures an the propo,ed
technology have not been quantified in our analysis.
a Capability-- expenditure
 trade-offs
This is necessary to achieve the highest probability
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of success for each technology-area.
®	 Aircraft production possibility trade-offs
This is necessary to judge employment impacts and
materials requirements.
> The ability to obtain and monitor the above six
i
relationships will provide NASA with information inputs to
control and manage the allocation of the $670 million in
program funds among the engine and airframe manufacturers and
their subcontractors.
The benefit estimates described in this report were
produced in a brief but intensive effort. 	 In order to prcduce
these estimates it was necessary to make several simplifying
assumptions concerning one of the major driving factors for
the introduction of new aircraft; 	 that is,	 the demand for air
transportation.	 While the results obtained are probably
suzziciently accurate for the purpose of evaluating the worth
of the proposed program at this timer the assumptions should
be subjected to further study. For example, in this analysis
it was assumed that the demand for short, medium and long range
air transportation would all increase at the same rate. if the
growth rate of one of these three categories is significantly
greater than the others, the mix of the technology to be deve-
loped to maximize fuel conservation could be modified. This
::-udy if demand should include:
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Analysis of specific city pairs
The demand between specific city pairs should be
studied to evaluate the expected travel volume for
differc.it stage lengths as well as the traffic
growth rate.	 This	 "bottom--up"	 analysis can be
used to predict more accurately future fleet
requirements.
dD Comparing the cost of travel using altornhtive
intermodal	 structures
This is necessary to evaluate the benefits accruing
in the short range air travel market and for the
assessment of the technology program directed
towards	 short range aircraft.
e Unbundling	 the growth assumptions
Fuel savings
	
(benefits)	 are sensitive to the rate
of growth,	 The effects of regulated	 load factors,
the impact of charters and the substitutability of
cargo capacity fox	 passenger capacity need further
investigation to evaluate their	 effect on the growthg	 g
rate of air travel &cmand.
An important area of	 further study	 relates to the
utilization of the NASA developed technology by the air,trans--
portation	 indust y.	 Witt► 	 a	 free market,	 existing	 aircraft will
be replaced by the airlines onl y whon it	 i , 	 economically
feasible	 and attractive to do so.	 Given a national objective
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of fuel conservation, it may be desirable for the government
to use incentives to encourage the replacement of older,
less effective aircraft with fuel conservative aircraft at an
earlier date than might otherwise occur. The nature of these
incentives, their costs and their impact upon the benefits
should be studied.
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